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THE UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF 
ANTI-REDLINING LEGISLATION 
RISA PALM 
JAMES CORBRIDGE 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
ABSTRACT 
Federal and state legislation intended to curb the practice of geographic loan 
discrimination or redlining may have the unintended and undesirable effect of 
preventing mortgage originators from using environmental characteristics as 
criteria in lending evaluations. Since the California fault rupture zones (special 
studies zones) do not contain systematic concentrations of poor, black, or elderly 
households, they should be targets for differential lending policies, such as 
mandatory earthquake insurance or structural reinforcements as conditions for 
mortgage loans. A clarification of the wording of the Housing Financial 
Discrimination Act is needed to alleviate some of the present potentially damaging 
effects of failing to discourage residential investment in surface fault rupture zones. 
Redlining is a form of geographic discrimination in lending. The term refers to 
the refusal to grant mortgage loans to otherwise qualified buyers for sound 
property in certain areas of the city [1]. "Redlining" was an early practice of 
the Home Owners Loan Corporation: maps were color coded to represent 
relative risks to lenders, with "hazardous" zones coded as red [2]. The decision 
that a neighborhood is a poor risk for mortgage loans has been based on several 
factors, including large numbers of renter-occupiers, changing racial composition, 
or visible signs of property deterioration [3]. This conservative lending policy 
has been justified on the argument that banks and saving and loans have a 
fiduciary responsibility to their investors to protect their savings from undue 
investment risk. 
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Two significant objections have been raised to redlining. First, it is claimed 
that disinvestment policies contribute to the further deterioration of the 
neighborhoods on which they are imposed. As less and less new capital is 
available for construction or improvements in these areas, a continuing decline 
in values sets in. Second, the neighborhoods to which redlining is applied are 
often inhabited by racial minorities at the lower end of the income scale. By 
imposing arbitrary mortgage lending restrictions on these homeowners, redlining 
results in racial discrimination, whether or not garbed as good business practice. 
In an effort to curb the perceived discriminatory effects of redlining, remedial 
legislation has been enacted by the Congress and by several of the state 
legislatures. The federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 requires a wide 
variety of lending institutions with assets of $ 10,000,000 or more and making 
"federally related mortgage loans" to make available, for public inspection, 
information on the number of average terms of home mortgages originated or 
purchased by that institution (12 U.S.C. #2801 ff.). The stated purpose of 
this legislation is to "provide the citizens and public officials of the United 
States with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether 
depository institutions are fulfilling their obligations to serve the housing needs 
of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located" (12 U.S.C. 
2801 (b) ). Presumably, informed depositors would not do business with 
lenders who were not "fulfilling their obligations." In addition, the practice of 
redlining is affected by the provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 
#3601 ff.) and the regulations issued under it (12 C.F.R. ##528.2 (a), 531.8 
(1981) ), which prohibit discriminatory lending practices. In 1976 a federal 
district court specifically upheld the application of the Act to redlining by a 
building and loan association which was a member of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board System. (Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 409 F.Supp. 489 
(1976).) The District of Columbia and five states, all of which have heavy urban 
concentrations, have passed legislation specifically aimed at controlling the 
racially discriminatory effects of redlining and the problems of disinvestment in 
particular urban neighborhoods. 
While the purposes of these federal and state laws are laudable, it can be 
argued that such legislation also may have unintended and undesirable impacts. 
In particular, such laws seem to prevent mortgage originators from using 
environmental characteristics as criteria in lending evaluations, even when such 
use would benefit prospective homebuyers and society as a whole. This paper 
will demonstrate the dilemma of these unintended consequences. 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 
Environmental hazards of one kind or another affect virtually every part of 
the United States [4]. Because some natural hazards threaten large areas and 
are not particularly place-specific, their effects cannot be mitigated through 
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simple residential relocation. Examples are tornadoes and severe winter storms. 
Other natural hazards are relatively fixed in place, based on geologic or 
hydrologie conditions, and are amenable to avoidance by careful control of the 
location of residential housing units. Among these latter hazards are storm 
surge susceptibility, earthquake-related surface fault rupture, landslide potential, 
and riverine flooding. It is these place-specific hazards whose effects may be 
mitigated by regulating the process of home mortgage lending. 
Mortgage lending policies have already been regulated to acknowledge the 
location of flood potential. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) presently require member 
banks to obtain from borrowers, before the loan is closed, "written acknowledge­
ment that the borrower realizes the property securing the loan is or will be 
located in an area identified as a flood hazard area and the borrower has received 
the required notice regarding the Federal disaster relief assistance" (12 C.F.R. 
#339.6(a); 12 C.F.R. #523.29(e) (1981)). In addition, under FDIC regulations, 
"no bank shall make, increase, extend, or renew any loan"'on improved real 
estate or a mobile home "located or to be located in an area that has been 
identified by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency as an 
area having special flood hazards" unless the building or mobile home and any 
personal property securing the loan is covered for the term of the loan by flood 
insurance." (12 CF. R. ##339.2, 339.3 (1981)). This seems to be an effective 
way to ensure that homebuyers are made aware of the possibility of flooding to 
their property and, through the purchase of subsidized flood insurance, to pay 
at least part of the costs involved in rebuilding and recovery associated with the 
inevitable flood. 
Earthquake hazards are not included in this disclosure and insurance program. 
Although the homeowner may purchase nonsubsidized earthquake insurance, 
there are no programs available which subsidize the costs of such insurance, or 
encourage, let alone require, its purchase. Acquisition of such coverage is left 
to the homeowner, and there are few economic incentives for an insurance 
agent to promote earthquake insurance along with the required fire insurance 
coverage [5]. As a result, only a minority of homeowners in areas particularly 
susceptible to earthquake damage have even inquired about earthquake insurance 
and even fewer have purchased it [6, 7] . 
To protect their investment in properties particularly susceptible to surface 
fault rupture, home mortgage originators might require the purchase of 
eatthquake insurance as a condition for granting a loan, or might use other 
methods, such as higher front-end points, higher interest rates, or outright 
refusal to lend, to protect their business interests. Although such requirements, 
including the mandatory purchase of earthquake insurance, would place an 
additional financial burden on the homebuyer, they would both inform the 
purchaser about the environmental hazards associated with the particular housing 
site, and would require the homeowner to bear part of the recovery costs 
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associated with surface fault rupture, much as the flood insurance program has 
done with riverine flooding. However, in the absence of federal legislation 
directing mortgage lenders to require the purchase of earthquake insurance, or 
permitting other means of self-insurance through higher mortgage costs, it appears 
that any action initiated by individual mortgage originators may run the risk of 
violating the fair lending acts recently enacted by certain states. 
To illustrate the dilemma created by the socially beneficial prohibition of 
mortgage lending discrimination leading to the socially undesirable result of 
encouraging homebuyers to purchase houses in environmentally hazardous 
areas, it is useful to examine the case of surface fault rupture zones in California. 
SURFACE FAULT RUPTURE ZONES 
Information about the location of surface fault rupture zones is provided to 
prospective homebuyers by real estate agents in California under the provisions 
of the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zones Act (Cal. Pub. Res. C ode #262Iff. 
(West 1982 Supp.)). This legislation, originally passed in 1972 following the 
destructive San Fernando earthquake of February 1981, was intended to prevent 
new large-scale development in areas particularly subject to surface fault rupture. 
The state geologist was directed to delineate, by December 31, 1973, 
"appropriately wide special studies zones to encompass all potentially and 
recently active traces of the San Andreas, Calaveras, Hayward, and San Jacinto 
Faults," as well as other faults which were "a potential hazard to structures 
from surface faulting or fault creep" (Cai. Pub. Res. Code #2622 (West 1982 
Supp.)). A 1975 amendment to the Act mandated disclosure of these zones by 
the real estate agent: "A person who is acting as an agent for a seller of real 
property which is located within a delineated special studies zone, or the seller 
if he is acting without an agent, shall disclose to any prospective purchaser the 
fact that the property is located within a delineated special studies zone" (Cai. 
Pub. Res. Code #2621.9 (West 1982 Supp.)). 
Despite the existence of this disclosure legislation, there is little awareness 
by purchasers of the meaning of location in the zones. A 1979 survey of recent 
homebuyers showed that homebuyers who had recently received the disclosure 
were no more likely to be aware of the existence of these zones, or the fact that 
their houses lay within them, than homebuyers outside the zones [7]. In 
addition, the majority of homebuyers surveyed within the zones could not 
remember that a disclosure has taken place. Among the possible explanations 
for these lapses of memory is the disclosure method used by the real estate 
agents—disclosure takes place at the least sensitive time in the sales transaction 
and conveys a minimal amount of information about the meaning of the special 
studies zones. Moreover, the name "special studies zone" in itself is not 
particularly evocative of surface fault rupture. 
This survey also found that a primary motivation for the selection of house 
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and neighborhood was economic—the probability that with a minimum 
investment, potential resale value would be maximized. Since recent experience 
shows that investment in houses within the zones does not impair the anticipated 
economic return, homebuyers can ignore with impunity the warning that they 
are within a surface fault rupture zone, at least in the context of probable profit 
on resale. The study concluded that "unless environmental hazards become 
translated into economic risks to individuals, hazard warnings not followed by 
severe disasters will probably not be heeded, and homebuyers will continue to 
purchase housing in areas susceptible to natural disasters regardless of the timing 
or form of the warning." [7, p. 97] 
If society values the protection of life and property through the avoidance of 
exposure to specified natural hazards such as surface fault rupture or fault 
creep, then some modification is required in the present system of property 
transactions. This modification could involve draconian land-use regulations, or 
could involve self-correcting mechanisms within the free enterprise system. 
Lenders who have a long-term property interest in the real estate securing a loan, 
for instance, might include a requirement that homebuyers purchase earthquake 
insurance policies or that higher interest rates be charged for loans made on 
properties within surface fault rupture hazard areas. Would such actions be 
feasible and legal? 
THE IMPACTS OF FINANCIAL DISCRIMINATION ACTS 
ON GEOLOGICALLY BASED LENDING POLICY 
California state law prohibits lending institutions from denying home loans 
or discriminating in setting the terms or conditions of such loans, if the denial 
or discrimination is based on "conditions, characteristics, or trends in the 
neighborhood, or geographic area" in which the property is located "unless the 
financial institution can demonstrate that such consideration in a particular 
case is required to avoid an unsafe and unsound business practice" (Cal. Admin. 
Code tit. 21, R. 7105(a) (1) (D) (1979)). 
The issue at hand is whether the avoidance of surface fault rupture zones can 
be equated with avoiding "an unsafe and unsound business practice." The 
California Administrative Code is quite specific in setting out the parameters of 
institutional discretion. Lenders can consider neighborhood characteristics if 
they can demonstrate that "one or more factors relating to the geographic area 
closely surrounding the security property are likely to cause the fair market 
value of the security property to decrease during the early (3-5) years of the 
mortgage term" (Cal. Admin. Code tit. 21, R. 7106 (B) (1) (1979)). In this 
determination, the lender is permitted to consider "both natural and other 
hazardous conditions surrounding the security property" (id!, R. 7106 (b) (2). 
What is prohibited is "unfounded and unsubstantial assumptions regarding the 
effect upon loan risk of the physical or economic characteristics of a neighborhood 
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or geographic area" (Cal. Admin. Code tit. 21, R. 7106(a) (1979)). The burden 
is on the lending institution to show the need for taking neighborhood 
characteristics into consideration in setting the terms and conditions of home loans. 
Although the law does not require lenders to approve mortage loan 
applications if the property is susceptible to damage within the first five years 
of the mortgage term, or if there is an imminent threat to the health and safety 
of the loan applicant were this person to inhabit a particular dwelling (Cal. 
Health & Safety Code #35813 (West 1982 Supp.)), it would seem that location 
within a special studies zone is not per se sufficient ground for a loan refusal 
or the modification of its terms. Since seismologists are not presently able to 
make precise predictions about the timing and extent of damage associated with 
surface faulting, it would not be possible for a lender to demonstrate that there 
would be a necessary decline in value of a property located within a fault rupture 
zone. Even where the location of the fault is precisely known, a dwelling unit is 
located astride the fault trace, and a reasonable certainty could be assigned to 
the occurrence of a major damaging earthquake over a twenty to thirty year 
period, no precise statements about the likely damage over the very short term 
(3-5 years) can be supported with scientific evidence. It must be concluded 
therefore that current California law, intended to assure access to mortgage 
credit by persons formerly subject to discriminatory lending practices, has the 
unintended effect of guaranteeing that property susceptible to damage within 
the thirty-year life of the mortgage must still get access to mortgage financing 
on the same terms as property not so situated. Modification of lending terms, 
such as the requirement of earthquake insurance or the imposition of additional 
loan costs, would not seem to be permitted under the stringent requirements of 
this state's Housing Financial Discrimination Act. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SURFACE FAULT 
RUPTURE ZONES WITH ETHNIC 
RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATIONS 
A very important question in the evaluation of the dual impacts of single-
purpose legislation is whether home mortgage discrimination against neighbor­
hoods within surface fault rupture zones would incidentally entail discrimination 
against neighborhoods containing substantial numbers of racial and ethnic 
minorities. This answer to this question is somewhat complex. 
In order to estimate the population and housing composition of the special 
studies zones, census tract boundaries were matched with the boundaries of a 
special studies zone. The entire population of a tract crossed by a special studies 
zone was considered "within the zone," unless the major population center of 
the tract lay outside the zone. The most serious problem of this method is that 
of over-estimation and possible bias in calculations. 
Census tracts were aggregated into fourteen special studies zones. All of the 
special studies zones within the major metropolitan areas of California were 
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analyzed, including zones in Los Angeles, Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, 
San Bernardino-Riverside, San Francisco-Oakland, San Jose, and Santa Rosa. 
Census tract data on twenty-one variables summarizing age, family status, 
occupational status, income, and housing tenure were compiled based on the 
1979 Census of Population. A mean for each variable was calculated for each 
special studies zone, and the data were further aggregated so that the median 
value for the composite of special studies zones could be calculated for each 
variable (Table 1). 
The composite figures for all of the zones showed that people living in the 
zones were slightly more wealthy than for the state as a whole, with fewer 
blacks, fewer persons over age seventy-five and fewer households headed by 
females. Housing was more likely to be owner-occupied and built after 1939. 
Thus, the zones did not-contain a disproportionate share of blacks, elderly or 
poor people in 1970. 
For the individual lender these figures may be deceptive. The Compton fault 
was 95.8 percent black in 1970, and the Calaveras fault zone, as represented by 
Gilroy, was 56.6 percent Spanish-speaking. In addition, the median value of 
housing in these areas as well as in the San Andreas-Desert communities, the 
San Jacinto fault zone, and the Antioch fault zone fell well below the average 
for the state. 
In other areas, however, lenders could be confident that lending policies 
related to surface fault rupture zonation would not disadvantage racial or 
ethnic minorities, the elderly, or the poor. In special studies zones such as 
Raymond Hill, San Andre.s-South San Francisco-Los Gatos, Green Valley, and 
Rogers Creek-Heraldsburg, lenders could consider location with respect to the 
fault zone in mortgage loan evaluations with no concern that such areas would 
contain large numbers of disadvantaged or minority populations. 
THE DILEMMA 
Previous studies have demonstrated quite clearly that there is need for 
legislative intervention in the home mortgage lending process to ensure that 
racial or ethnic minorities receive the same access to mortgage credit as the 
majority population. In a detailed study based on census tract-zip code data 
gathered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board survey of Chicago (1973), and 
on individual loan applications based on the Comptroller of the Currency's Fair 
Housing Lending Practices Survey (1971), Listokin and Casey found that race 
had a strong independent effect on lending behavior [8]. The Chicago study 
showed that the racial composition of the neighborhood had an independent 
effect on the volume of loans in the neighborhood, and the micro-level data 
showed that race of the mortgage loan applicant had an effect on the decision to 
accept or reject the toan application, even after controlling for economic 
characteristics of the borrowers. These two analyses indicate the need for some 
regulation of mortgage lending policy to ensure equitable treatment of minorities. 
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The dilemma is that regulation of mortgage lending policy, with the intent 
of preventing racial discrimination, may also be interpreted as proscribing 
geologic discrimination. The latter interpretation may occur despite the fact 
that special studies zones (fault rupture zones) in California do not, taken as 
a group, contain a systematic concentration of black, Spanish-speaking, or low 
income population. If California law were modified to permit discrimination 
in mortgage lending on the basis of the location with respect to a surface fault 
trace, in most fault zones it would not be the minority or low income population 
which would primarily be impacted. 
Whether the remedy be the lender's capability to adjust the terms of the 
loan, or mandatory earthquake insurance, California law needs to be revised to 
ease the burden for the lender of demonstrating that investment in properties in 
fault rupture zones constitutes an "unsafe or unsound business practice." The 
California Housing Financial Discrimination Act of 1977, as presently worded, 
at the very least discourages mortgage lenders from taking actions which could 
benefit both themselves and homebuyers, economically and environmentally. 
Mortgage lending in surface fault zones should be discouraged, and earthquake 
insurance should be required for those persons who choose to live in such areas. 
This can be done in a way which retains the law's laudable policy of avoiding 
racial discrimination, without the unintentional effect of limiting the possibilities 
of a geologically based lending policy. A clarification of the wording of the 
Housing Financial Discrimination Act would help to alleviate some of the present 
potentially disastrous effects of failing to discourage residential investment in 
surface fault rupture zones. 
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